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Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of a ‘structured occur-
rence net’, which as its name indicates is based on that of
an ‘occurrence net’, a well-established formalism for an ab-
stract record that represents causality and concurrency in-
formation concerning a single execution of a system. Struc-
tured occurrence nets consist of multiple occurrence nets,
associated together by means of various types of relation-
ship, and are intended for recording either the actual be-
haviour of complex systems as they interact and evolve, or
evidence that is being gathered and analyzed concerning
their alleged past behaviour. We provide a formal basis for
the new formalism and show how it can be used to gain bet-
ter understanding of complex fault-error-failure chains (i)
among co-existing interacting systems, (ii) between systems
and their sub-systems, and (iii) involving systems that are
controlling, supporting, creating or modifying other sys-
tems. We then go on to discuss how, perhaps using extended
versions of existing tools, structured occurrence nets could
form a basis for improved techniques of system failure pre-
vention and analysis.
Keywords: failures, errors, faults, dependability, judge-
ment, occurrence nets, abstraction, formal analysis.
1 Introduction
The concept of a failure of a system is central both to
system dependability and to system security, two closely
associated and indeed somewhat overlapping research do-
mains. Specifically, particular types of failures (e.g., pro-
ducing wrong results, ceasing to operate, revealing secret
information, causing loss of life, etc.) relate to, indeed
enable the definition of, what can be regarded as differ-
ent attributes of dependability/security: respectively relia-
bility, availability, confidentiality, safety, etc. The paper by
Avizienis et al. [1] provides an extended (informal) discus-
sion of the basic concepts and terminology of dependability
and security, and contains a detailed taxonomy of depend-
ability and security terms. Our aims in this present paper
are:
• to improve our understanding — in part by formalising
— of the concept of failure (and error and fault) as
given by [1];
• to reduce (in fact by uniting the apparently different
concepts of ‘system’ and ‘state’) the number of base
concepts, i.e., concepts that the paper uses without ex-
plicit definition; and
• to initiate an investigation of possible improved tech-
niques of system failure prevention and analysis.
Complex real systems, made up of other systems, and
made by other systems (e.g., of hardware, software and peo-
ple) evidently fail from time to time, and reducing the fre-
quency and severity of their failures is a major challenge —
common to both the dependability and the security commu-
nities. Indeed, a dependable/secure system can be regarded
as one whose (dependability/security) failures are not unac-
ceptably frequent or severe (from some given viewpoint).
We will return shortly to the issue of viewpoint. But first
let us quote the definitions of three basic and subtly-distinct
concepts, termed ‘failure’, ‘fault’ and ‘error’ in [1]:
‘A system failure occurs when the delivered ser-
vice deviates from fulfilling the system function,
the latter being what the system is aimed at. An
error is that part of the system state which is li-
able to lead to subsequent failure: an error af-
fecting the service is an indication that a failure
occurs or has occurred. The adjudged or hypoth-
esised cause of an error is a fault.’
Note that errors do not necessarily lead to failures —
such occurrences may be avoided by chance or design. Sim-
ilarly, failures in a component system do not necessarily
constitute faults to the surrounding system — this depends
on how the surrounding system is relying on the component.
These three concepts (respectively an event, a state, and
a cause) are evidently distinct, and so need to be distin-
guished, whatever names are chosen to denote them. The
above quotation makes it clear that judgement can be in-
volved in identifying error causes, i.e., faults. However it
is also the case that identifying failures and errors involves
judgement — a critical point that we will return to shortly.
A failure occurs when an error ‘passes through’ the
system-user interface and affects the service delivered by
the system — a system being composed of components
which are themselves systems. This failure may be signif-
icant, and thus constitute a fault, to the enclosing system.
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Thus the manifestation of failures, faults and errors follows
a ‘fundamental chain’:
. . .→ failure → fault → error → failure → fault → . . .
i.e.,
. . .→ event → cause → state → event → cause → . . .
It is critical to note that this chain can flow from one system
to: (i) another system that it is interacting with; (ii) a sys-
tem which it is part of; and (iii) a system which it creates or
sustains.
Typically, a failure will be judged to be due to multiple
co-incident faults, e.g., the activity of a hacker exploiting a
bug left by a programmer. Identifying failures (and hence
errors and faults), even understanding the concepts, is dif-
ficult. There can be uncertainties about system boundaries,
the very complexity of the systems (and of any specifica-
tions) is often a major difficulty, the determination of pos-
sible causes or consequences of failure can be a very sub-
tle and iterative process, and any provisions for preventing
faults from causing failures may themselves be fallible.
Attempting to enumerate a system’s possible failures be-
forehand is normally impracticable. Instead, one can appeal
to the notion of a ‘judgemental system’. The ‘environment’
of a system is the wider system that it affects (by its correct
functioning, and by its failures), and is affected by. What
constitutes correct (failure-free) functioning might be im-
plied by a system specification — assuming that this exists,
and is complete, accurate and agreed. (Often the specifica-
tion is part of the problem!) However, in principle a third
system, a judgemental system, is involved in determining
whether any particular activity (or inactivity) of a system in
a given environment constitutes or would constitute — from
its viewpoint — a failure.
Note that the judgemental system and the environmental
system might be one and the same, and the judgement might
be instant or delayed. The judgemental system might itself
fail — as judged by some further system — and different
judges, or the same judge at different times, might come to
different judgements.
The term ‘Judgemental System’ is deliberately broad —
it covers from on-line failure detector circuits, via someone
equipped with a system specification, to the retrospective
activities of a court of enquiry (just as the term ‘system’ is
meant to range from simple hardware devices to complex
computer-based systems, composed of hardware, software
and people).
Thus the judging activity may be clear-cut and auto-
matic, or essentially subjective — though even in the lat-
ter case a degree of predictability is essential, otherwise the
system designers’ task would be impossible. The judge-
ment is an action by a system, and so can in principle fail
either positively or negatively. This possibility is allowed
for in the legal system, hence the concept of a hierarchy of
crown courts, appeal courts, supreme courts, etc.
In this paper we describe a means of modelling the ac-
tivity of systems — operational computing systems, the
systems of people and computers that created them or are
adapting them, the systems that are passing judgements on
them, etc. The formalism that we use in this paper, in order
to clarify, and exploit, such concepts as fault-error-failure
chains, and the role of judgemental systems, is based on
that of occurrence nets [2, 6, 17] and our extensions of such
nets [13].
Condition (place) Event (transition)
Past condition Extant condition
Interaction
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6e1
e2
e4
e3
An occurrence net
Figure 1. Basic notation.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, occurrence nets are directed
acyclic graphs that portray the (alleged) past and present
state of affairs, in terms of places (i.e., conditions, repre-
sented by circles), transitions (i.e., events, represented by
squares) and arrows (each from a place to a transition, or
from a transition to a place, representing (alleged) causal-
ity). For simple nets, an actual graphical representation suf-
fices — and will be used here using the notation shown in
Fig. 1. (In the case of complex nets, these might be better
represented in some linguistic or tabular form.)
We will also take advantage of our belated realization
that the concepts of ‘system’ and ‘state’ are not separate,
but just a question of abstraction, so that (different related)
occurrence nets can represent both systems and their states
using the same symbol — a ‘place’. In fact in this paper
we introduce and define, and discuss the utility of, several
types of relationship, and term a set of related occurrence
nets a structured occurrence net (or SON).
These types of relationship differ depending on the spe-
cific means and objectives of a particular investigation.
However, there are some fundamental constraints that any
structured occurrence net ought to satisfy. Crucially, we
will require that the structures we admit avoid cycles in sys-
tems’ temporal behaviour as these contradict the accepted
view on the way physical systems could possibly behave.
It easy to understand how occurrence nets could be ‘gen-
erated’ by executing Petri nets representing computing sys-
tems, but they could in fact be used to record the execution
of any (potentially asynchronous) process, hardware or soft-
ware, indeed human, no matter what notation or language
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might be used to define it. (It is worth noting that various
other graphical notations similar to occurrence nets can be
found in both the hardware and the software design worlds,
e.g., strand spaces [18], signal diagrams [19] and message
sequence charts [14].)
2 Occurrence nets
In this section, we present the basic model of an occur-
rence net, which is standard within Petri net theory [2, 6,
17]. Later on, we will extend it to express more intricate
features of our approach to the modelling of complex be-
haviours.
In a nutshell, an occurrence net is an abstract record of
a single execution of some computing system1 in which
only information about causality and concurrency between
events and visited local states is represented. Together with
a natural requirement that causal cycles do not occur in the
physical world, this means that the underlying mathemati-
cal structure of an occurrence net is that of a partial order.
This should be contrasted with an ‘interleaving’ record of
a computation which presupposes a sequential ordering of
all the events involved, and has as an underlying structure a
total (rather than partial) order.
Definition 2.1 (occurrence net) An occurrence net is a
triple ON = (C,E, F ) where: C 6= ∅ and E are finite2
disjoint sets of respectively conditions and events (collec-
tively, conditions and events are the nodes of ON ); and
F ⊆ (C × E) ∪ (E × C) is a flow relation satisfying the
following:
• For every condition c there is at most one e such that
(e, c) ∈ F , and at most one f such that (c, f) ∈ F .
• For every event e there is at least one c such that
(c, e) ∈ F , and at least one d such that (e, d) ∈ F .
• ON forms an acyclic graph (in other words, the tran-
sitive closure of the relation F , denoted by F+, is ir-
reflexive).
In the above definition — aimed at capturing the essence
of a computation history — E represents the events which
have actually been executed andC represents conditions (or
holding of local states) enabling their executions. Here we
will discuss computation histories as though they have actu-
ally occurred; however, the term will also be used of ‘histo-
ries’ that might have occurred, or that might occur in the fu-
ture, given the existence of an appropriate system. The flow
1It is standard to describe an occurrence net as computation even
though they can be used to portray behaviours of quite general systems,
e.g., ones that include people.
2For simplicity, we only discuss finite behaviours and so all (structured)
occurrence nets considered in this paper will be finite.
relation records the causality relationship between events
and conditions. Clearly, not all such relationships are mean-
ingful (both in a local and global sense) and the restrictions
in the above definition are meant to exclude impossible sce-
narios. More precisely, the first condition means that each
non-initial condition is uniquely caused, and each of the
non-final conditions caused a unique event.3 The second
condition states that each event has at least one cause and at
least one effect, and the third one simply renders formal a
common belief that causality is not circular. Now we intro-
duce few useful notations:
• For each condition or event x we use pre(x) and
post(x) to denote the set of all elements y such that
(y, x) ∈ F and (x, y) ∈ F , respectively. In other
words, pre() and post() correspond to the incoming
and outgoing arcs, respectively.
For a set of nodes X ⊆ C ∪ E, we denote pre(X) =⋃
x∈X pre(x) and post(X) =
⋃
x∈X post(x).
• Two distinct nodes of ON , x and y, are causally re-
lated if (x, y) ∈ F+ or (y, x) ∈ F+; otherwise they
are concurrent.
• During the execution captured by the occurrence net,
the system has passed through a series of (global)
states, and the concurrency relation in ON provides
full information about all such potential states. A cut
is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) set of conditions
Cut ⊆ C which are mutually concurrent.
• Let Cut initON and Cut
fin
ION be the sets of all conditions
c such that pre(c) = ∅ and post(c) = ∅, respectively.
These two sets are cuts and, intuitively, the former cor-
responds to the initial state of the history represented
by ON , and the latter to its final state.
For the occurrence net depicted in Fig. 1, we have
C = {c1, . . . , c6} and E = {e1, . . . , e4}. Moreover,
Cut initON = {c1} and Cut
fin
ION = {c6}, and the other four
cuts are {c2, c3}, {c2, c5}, {c4, c3} and {c4, c5}.
An occurrence net is usually derived from a single exe-
cution history of the system. However, since it only records
essential (causal) orderings, it also conveys information
about other potential executions. This calls for a precise
notion of an execution of a given occurrence net.
Definition 2.2 (sequential execution) A sequential execu-
tion of the occurrence net ON is D0 e1 D1 . . . en Dn,
where each Di is a set of conditions and each ei is an
event, such that D0 = Cut initON and, for every i ≤ n,
pre(ei) ⊆ Di−1 and Di = (Di−1 \ pre(ei)) ∪ post(ei).
We will call e1 . . . en a firing sequence of ON .
3Note that if an event is only conditional on the presence of a condition,
but does not invalidate it, then the event can re-establish this condition by
producing a fresh copy of the condition.
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For the occurrence net depicted in Fig. 1, we have that
{c1} e1 {c2, c3} e2 {c4, c3} e3 {c4, c5} e4 {c6} is one of its
possible sequential executions.
Thus an execution starts in the initial global state, and
each successive event transforms a current global state into
another one according to the set of conditions in its vicinity.
Basically, all conditions (local states) which made possi-
ble its execution cease to hold, and new conditions (local
states) created by the event begin to hold. The above defini-
tion implies a couple of simple, yet important facts formu-
lated next. Basically, they imply that ON is sound in the
sense of obeying some natural temporal properties as well
as testifying to the fact that ON does not contain redundant
parts. We also have a complete characterisation of global
states reachable from the default initial one — these are all
the cuts of ON . In practical terms, the latter means that
we can verify state properties of the computations captured
by ON by running a model checker which inspects all the
cuts. Such a model checker could be based on a SAT-solver,
e.g., as in [9], or integer programming, e.g., as in [7].
Theorem 2.3 ([2]) Given a sequential execution as in
Def. 2.2, each Di is a cut of ON , and no event occurs more
than once.
Theorem 2.4 ([2]) Each cut of ON can be reached from
the initial cut through some execution. Moreover, each event
of ON is involved in at least one sequential execution.
An alternative, more concurrent, notion of execution
is obtained by considering that in a single computational
move, a set of events (called a step) rather than a single
event is executed.
Definition 2.5 (step execution) A step execution of the oc-
currence netON is D0 G1 D1 . . . Gn Dn, where eachDi is
a set of conditions and each Gi is a set of events, such that
D0 = Cut
init
ON and, for every i ≤ n, we have pre(Gi) ⊆
Di−1 and Di = (Di−1 \ pre(Gi)) ∪ post(Gi).
For the occurrence net depicted in Fig. 1, we have that
{c1} {e1} {c2, c3} {e2, e3} {c4, c5} {e4} {c6} is one of its
possible step executions.
For the basic model of occurrence nets, the sequential
and step executions are broadly speaking equivalent; in par-
ticular, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 hold also for step executions.
However, for extended notions of occurrence nets, which
we discussed in [10], sequential and step executions may,
e.g., admit different sets of reachable global states.
3 Structuring occurrence nets
We now outline two simple ways of structuring occur-
rence nets which will be used in the subsequent sections of
the paper.
The first one captures system interaction, i.e., a situa-
tion in which two or more systems (in other words, a com-
pound system) proceed concurrently and (occasionally) in-
teract with each other. As shown in Fig. 2, the systems —
in this case two — or more precisely the actions of two sys-
tems, are represented by occurrence nets. We will follow a
convention that conditions and events of different systems
are recognised by shading them differently. There are some
obvious rules about legal such colourings (e.g., that they
partition the nodes into disjoint sets the members of each
of which are connected; in this case, linearly but in general
any occurrence net might be used).
Figure 2. System interaction.
We have two types of interactions to relate events of sep-
arate systems, represented by thick dashed arcs (relation κ
in the next definition) and edges (relation σ in the next defi-
nition). The former relation means that one event is a causal
predecessor of another event (in other words, information
flow was unidirectional), while the latter means that two
events have been executed synchronously (in other words,
information flow was bidirectional).
Definition 3.1 (interaction ON) An interaction occurrence
net is a tuple ION = (ON 1, . . . ,ON k, κ, σ), where each
ON i = (Ci, Ei, Fi) is an occurrence net,4 and κ, σ ⊆⋃
i6=j Ei × Ej are two relations (σ being symmetric) such
that the relation PrecION = F|C×C ∪ (F ◦ (κ∪ σ) ◦F) is
acyclic.
In the above, as well as later on, we denote C =
⋃
i Ci,
F =
⋃
i Fi and E =
⋃
i Ei.
Intuitively, if (e, f) ∈ κ then e cannot happen after f , and
if (e, f) ∈ σ then e and f must happen synchronously.
For an interaction occurrence net as in Def. 3.1, cuts and
step executions need to be re-defined. A cut of ION is a
maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) set of conditions Cut ⊆ C
such that (Cut × Cut) ∩ Prec+ION = ∅. The initial cut
of ION , Cut initION , is the union of the initial cuts of all the
ON i’s.
Definition 3.2 (step execution of ION) A step execution
of the interaction occurrence net ION is a sequence
D0 G1 D1 . . . Gn Dn, where each Di ⊆ C is a set of con-
ditions and each Gi ⊆ E is a set of events, such that
G0 = Cut
init
ION and, for every i ≤ n, we have:
4In this, and other similar definitions, we assume that different occur-
rence nets have disjoint sets of nodes.
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• pre(Gi) ⊆ Di−1;
• Di = (Di−1 \ pre(Gi)) ∪ post(Gi);
• (e, f) ∈ κ and f ∈ Gi implies e ∈
⋃
j≤i Dj; and
(e, f) ∈ σ and f ∈ Gi implies e ∈ Di.
We can re-establish the following basic behavioural char-
acteristics of occurrence nets (proofs of these, and other
new results formulated later on, are provided in [13]).
Theorem 3.3 Given a step execution as in Def. 3.2, each
Di is a cut of ION , and no event occurs more than once.
Theorem 3.4 Each cut of ION can be reached from the
initial cut through some step execution. Moreover, each
event of ION is involved in at least one step execution of
ION .
We also have the following result which captures a con-
sistency between the individual and interactive views of
computation.
Theorem 3.5 Given a step execution as in Def. 3.2,
• D0∩Cm G1∩Em D1∩Cm . . . Gn∩Em Dn∩Cm is
a step execution of ONm, for every m ≤ k.
• e ∈ Gi, f ∈ Gj and (e, f) ∈ κ (or (e, f) ∈ σ) imply
i ≤ j (resp. i = j), for all i, j ≤ n.
Note, however, that it may happen that a cut of an in-
dividual occurrence net ON i may no longer be reachable
through any step execution of the composite system ION .
Structures like that shown in Fig. 2 capture interactions
between different systems but give no information about
the evolution of individual systems. This orthogonal view
is illustrated in Fig. 3, where we have a two-level view
of a system’s history. The two levels are delineated by
dashed boxes, whereas (as before) dotted boxes will de-
lineate occurrence nets when there are multiple occurrence
nets within a level.
Figure 3. Simple abstraction.
A possible interpretation of Fig. 3 is that the upper level
provides a high-level view of system which went through
two successive versions which are represented by two con-
ditions of the upper occurrence net (the event in the middle
represents a version update). The lower occurrence net cap-
tures the behaviour of the system during the same period.
Fig. 3 also shows the ‘abstracts’ relation working across
the two levels of description. The relation connects condi-
tions in the lower part with those in the upper part which
abstract them. We omit a formal definition of the two-level
occurrence net as it is a special case of the construct intro-
duced later in Def. 4.3.
4 Evolutional Abstractions
As already indicated in Fig. 3, any condition can
be viewed either as a state (of some system), or as a
(sub)system itself that presumably has its own states and
events — just which is simply a matter of viewpoint. More-
over, as indicated in Fig. 2, behaviours of different systems
can interact with each other. In general, it is possible to
have sets of related occurrence nets, some showing what
has happened in terms of systems and their evolution, the
other showing the behaviours of these systems. In fact, the
former can be viewed as the behavioural abstraction of the
latter. What comes now is a combination of the structuring
mechanisms that were illustrated in Fig. 2 and 3.
Abstraction:
two (extant)
systems
Two (active)
systems
in operation
Figure 4. Behavioural abstraction.
Fig. 4 shows a simple example, involving the interacting
activities of two systems (note that the same shading is used
for the higher- and lower-level view of each system). This
picture gives no information about the evolution of the two
systems — some such additional information is portrayed
in the following figures. Moreover, the upper part of the
picture does not provide any information about the interac-
tions between the two systems (basically, all it says is that
‘there are two systems’).
More interesting is Fig. 5(a) which shows the history of
an online modification of two systems, i.e., one in which
the modified systems carry on from the states that had been
reached by the original systems — a possibility that is easy
to imagine, though often difficult to achieve dependably, es-
pecially with software systems. In this case, the ‘abstracts’
relation is non-trivial as it identifies those parts of the be-
haviours which are pre- and post-modification ones.
5
(a)
(b)
Figure 5. System modifications.
Another type of system modification is shown in
Fig. 5(b). It again shows that the two systems have each suf-
fered some sort of modification, i.e., have evolved, once —
the ‘abstracts’ relations between the two levels show which
state sequences are associated with the systems before they
were modified, and which with the modified systems. Note
that in this case the behaviour of each system is represented
by two disjoint occurrence nets. Thus the standard theory
does not work as desired as it would consider these two
parts as concurrent whereas, in fact, one is meant to pre-
cede the other. In the proposed structured view the upper
part provides the necessary information for the desired se-
quencing of the occurrence nets.
The last motivating example in this section, Fig. 6, shows
some of the earlier history of the two systems in Fig. 4, i.e.,
that one system has spawned the other system, and after
that both systems went through some independent further
evolutions.
We will now formalise the ‘evolutional abstractions’ out-
lined above. After an auxiliary definition, we introduce the
notion of an occurrence net corresponding to a record of
modification, creation, etc., of some compound system.
Definition 4.1 (interval) Let ON = (C,E, F ) be an oc-
currence net. Its interval is a non-empty set of condi-
tions int = {c1, . . . , cm} such that there exist events
e1, . . . , em−1 satisfying (ci, ei) ∈ F and (ei, ci+1) ∈ F ,
for every i ≤ m− 1.
An interval satisfies two main properties: (i) the conditions
it comprises are causally totally ordered, and (ii) there are
no ‘gaps’ in the sequence of consecutive states it comprises.
Both stem from the fact that int is meant to capture succes-
sive stages in the evolution of some system.
Definition 4.2 (evolutional ON) An evolutional occur-
rence net is EON = (ON , ℓ), where ON = (C,E, F )
is an occurrence net and ℓ : C → {1, . . . , N} (N ≥ 1).
Moreover, the inverse image ℓ−1(i) = {c ∈ C | ℓ(c) = i}
is an interval, for every i ∈ SYS .
The next definition combines together the above ideas
about structuring behaviours of interacting systems.
Definition 4.3 (evolutional SON) An evolutional struc-
tured occurrence net is a tuple ESON=(EON , ION , α),
where EON and ION are as in Def. 4.2 and 3.1, respec-
tively, and α : C → C is a mapping such that:
• ℓ(α(C)) = SYS;
• α(Ci) ∩ α(Cj) 6= ∅ implies i = j, for all i, j ≤ k;
• α(Ci) is an interval and |ℓ(α(Ci))|=1, for all i ≤ k;
• for every i ≤ k and every condition c ∈ C with
α−1(c) ⊆ Ci, the sets Minc and Max c of, respec-
tively, all minimal and maximal elements of α−1(c)
w.r.t. the flow relation Fi are cuts of ON i;
• for every i ≤ N and all conditions b, c, d ∈ C such
that ℓ(α(b))=ℓ(α(d))=i, if (α(b), α(c)) ∈ F+ and
(α(c), α(d)) ∈ F+, then we have ℓ(α(c))=i;
• PrecESON = PrecION ∪ Prec is an acyclic relation,
where Prec is the union of sets Max c ×Mind, for all
e ∈ E and (c, d) ∈ pre(e)×post(e).
Intuitively, PrecION captures causalities resulting from
intra-level interactions between behaviours, whereas Prec
reflects the succession of evolutions the system had under-
gone during the history captured by ESON .
We now introduce cuts and step executions for the evo-
lutional structured occurrence net in Def. 4.3.
Figure 6. System creation.
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A cut of ESON is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) set
of conditions Cut ⊆ C ∪ C such that (Cut × Cut) ∩
(Prec+ESON ∪ F
+) = ∅ and, moreover, α(Cut ∩ C) =
Cut ∩C. (Taking into account F+ means that only a single
version of a system can be active at any time.)
The initial cut of ESON is the union, Cut initESON , of the
initial cut of ON and the initial cuts of all the ON i’s such
that α(Cut initON i) ∩ Cut
init
ON 6= ∅.
Definition 4.4 (step execution of SON) A step execution
of the evolutional structured occurrence net ESON is a
sequence D0 G1 D1 . . .Gn Dn, where each Di ⊆ C ∪ C
is a set of conditions and each Gi ⊆ E ∪ E is a set of
events, such that G0 = Cut initESON and, for every i ≤ n,
we have the following (below Min = ⋃c∈post(E∩Gi) Minc
and Max =
⋃
c∈pre(E∩Gi)
Max c):
• pre(Gi) ∪Max ⊆ Di−1 and post(Max ) ⊆ Gi;
• Di = (Di−1 \ (pre(Gi) ∪Max )) ∪ post(Gi) ∪Min;
• (e, f) ∈ κ and f ∈ Gi implies e ∈
⋃
j≤i Dj; and
• (e, f) ∈ σ and f ∈ Gi implies e ∈ Di.
As before, the notion of a structured occurrence net has
behavioural properties similar to those satisfied by standard
occurrence nets.
Theorem 4.5 Given a step execution as in Def. 4.4, each
Di is a cut of ESON , and no event occurs more than once.
Theorem 4.6 Each cut of ESON can be reached from the
initial cut through some step execution. Moreover, each
event of ESON is involved in at least one step execution
of ESON .
We next establish a consistency between the individual
and interactive views of computation, intertwined with the
record of evolutions of the systems involved.
Theorem 4.7 Given a step execution as in Def. 4.4, for ev-
ery m ≤ k, we have:
D0∩Cm G1∩Em D1∩Cm . . . Gn∩Em Dn∩Cm
is either a sequence of empty steps, or a step exe-
cution of the occurrence net ONm possibly preceded
and/or followed by a sequence of empty sets (in the
former case, the first non-empty set is the initial cut
of ONm, and in the latter the final one). Moreover,
D0∩C G1∩E D1∩C . . . Gn∩E Dn∩C is a step exe-
cution of the occurrence net ON .
A result similar to the second part of Theorem 3.5 also
holds. The results obtained here form a starting point for
a systematic development of model checking techniques
based on ESON . For example, one can attempt to verify
state based properties of evolving systems by inspecting all
cuts of ESON .
5 Spatial and Temporal Abstractions
Another type of abstraction, that we will call composi-
tion abstraction, is based on the relation ‘contains / is com-
ponent of’. Fig. 7 shows the behaviour of a system and
of its three component systems, and how its behaviour is
related to that of its components. (This figure does not rep-
resent the matter of how, or indeed whether, the component
systems are enabled to interact, i.e., what design is used,
or what connectors are involved.) Having identified such a
set of interacting systems, and hence the containing system
which they make up, then each member of this set has the
other members as its environment.
Figure 7. System composition.
Definition 5.1 (spatial abstraction SON) A spatial ab-
straction structured occurrence net is a tuple SASON =
(ON , ION , ϑ, ǫ), where ON and ION are as in Def. 2.1
and 3.1, ϑ : C → 2C and ǫ : E → E, and, moreover,
the following hold (below ϑ(H) = ⋃c∈H ϑ(c), for every
H ⊆ C):
• ϑ(C) = C and ǫ(E) = E;
• if Cut is a cut of ON and c, d ∈ Cut , then ϑ(Cut) is
a cut of ION and ϑ(c) ∩ ϑ(d) = ∅;
• for every event e ∈ E, pre(e)⊆ϑ(pre(ǫ(e))) and
post(e)⊆ϑ(post(ǫ(e)));
• PrecSASON = PrecION ∪ Prec
′ is an acyclic rela-
tion, where Prec′ is the union of relations (ϑ(pre(e))\
ϑ(post(e))) × ǫ−1(e) and ǫ−1(e) × (ϑ(post(e)) \
ϑ(pre(e))), for all e ∈ E.
One can define the cuts and step executions for SASON
similarly as it has been done in for ESON , and then obtain
results similar in essence and applicability to those formu-
lated for ESON .
The above is in effect a spatial abstraction — one can
also have a temporal abstraction, through the ‘abbrevia-
tion’ relation, i.e., an abbreviation abstraction, as shown
in Fig. 8(a).
When one ‘abbreviates’ parts of an occurrence net one is
in effect defining atomic actions, i.e., actions that appear to
be instantaneous to their environment. The rules that enable
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 8. System abbreviation.
one to make such abbreviations are non-trivial when multi-
ple concurrent activities are shown in the net. These are best
illustrated by an alternative representation for an occurrence
net together with its abbreviations, namely a structured oc-
currence net in which each abbreviated section (or ‘atomic’
activity) of the net is shown surrounded by an enclosing
‘event box’.
Fig. 8(b) shows this alternative representation of
Fig. 8(a), the top part of which can readily be recreated
by ‘collapsing’ Fig. 8(b)’s occurrence net, i.e., by replacing
the enclosed sections by simple event symbols, as shown in
Fig. 8(b).
This net collapsing operation is much trickier with occur-
rence nets that represent asynchronous activity since there
is a need to avoid introducing cycles into what is meant to
be an acyclic directed graph. (Hence the need, on occasion,
to use synchronous system interactions.) This is the main
subject of [3] and is illustrated in Fig. 9.
After an auxiliary definition, we introduce the notion of
a structured occurrence net corresponding to a temporal ab-
straction of some compound system.
Definition 5.2 (block) A block of an occurrence net
ON = (C,E, F ) is a non-empty set Bl ⊂ C ∪ E of nodes
where both the maximal and minimal (w.r.t. the flow rela-
tion F ) elements are events, and for all nodes x, y ∈ Bl ,
(x, z) ∈ F+ and (z, y) ∈ F+ imply z ∈ Bl .
Thus in a block there are no ‘gaps’ between the nodes it
comprises, and it starts and ends in a set of events. (Note
that a single event is a block.)
Definition 5.3 (temporal abstraction SON) A temporal
abstraction structured occurrence net is T ASON =
(ION , ION ′, ξ) where ION is as in Def. 3.1,
ION ′ = (ON ′1, . . . ,ON
′
k, κ
′, σ′) is an interaction
occurrence net with ON ′i = (C′i, E′i, F ′i ) (for i ≤ k), and
ξ : C′ ∪ E′ → C ∪ E; and, moreover, the following are
satisfied, for every i ≤ k (below C′ = ⋃i C′i, F′ =
⋃
i F
′
i
and E′ =
⋃
i E
′
i):
• ξ(C′i∪E
′
i) = Ci∪Ei, ξ
−1(Ci) ⊆ C′i and ξ(E′i) = Ei;
(a)
(b)
Figure 9. Two valid collapsings.
• ξ−1(e) is a block of ON ′i, for every e ∈ Ei;
• |ξ−1(c)| = 1, for every c ∈ Ci;
• Fi = {(x, y) | (ξ−1(x) × ξ−1(y)) ∩ F ′i 6= ∅};
• κ = {(e, f) | (ξ−1(e)× ξ−1(f)) ∩ κ′ 6= ∅}; and
• σ = {(e, f) | (ξ−1(e)× ξ−1(f)) ∩ σ′ 6= ∅} ∪
{(e, f) | (((ξ−1(e)× ξ−1(f)) ∩ κ′ 6= ∅) ∧
((ξ−1(f)×ξ−1(e))∩κ′ 6= ∅))}.
A practical way in which temporal abstraction might be
used is to analyse the behaviour at the higher level of ab-
straction, which can be done more efficiently, and after find-
ing a problem mapping it to a corresponding behaviour at
the lower level (and possibly continuing the analysis there).
To give a flavour of the kind of result which would provide
an underpinning for this approach, we have the following.
Theorem 5.4 Let T ASON be a temporal abstrac-
tion structured occurrence net as in Def. 5.3, and
D0 {e1}D1 . . . {en}Dn be a step execution of ION . Let
i ≤ k and f1 . . . fq be the subsequence of e1 . . . en com-
prising the events in Ei. For every j ≤ q, let ej1 . . . ejmj
be a firing sequence of ON ′i involving exactly the events
of ξ−1(fj) starting from pre(fj) (which is possible). Then
e11 . . . e1m1 . . . en1 . . . eqmq is a firing sequence of ON ′i.
In this section we have presented composition and ab-
breviation, i.e., spatial and temporal abstraction, as though
they are quite separate — in practice, it is likely that useful
abstractions will often be both spatial and temporal.
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6 Dependability
To allow for the possibility of failure a system might,
e.g., make use of ‘recovery points’. Such recovery points
can be recorded in states that take no further (direct) part in
the system’s ongoing (normal) behavior, as shown below.
Figure 10. State retention.
The notion of a ‘failure’ event involves, in principle,
three systems — the given (possibly failing) system, its en-
vironment, and a judging system. This judging system may
interact directly and immediately with the given system, in
which case it is part of the system’s environment, e.g., in
VLSI an on-chip facility [12]; another example, in a very
different world, is a football referee! Alternatively the judg-
ing system may also be deployed after the fact using an oc-
currence net that represents how the failing event occurred.
Such an occurrence net is also something that can for exam-
ple be recorded in a retained state, e.g., that of the judgment
system. Fig. 11 is an attempt to portray this. It deliberately
portrays a situation in which a judgement system has ob-
tained only incomplete evidence of the systems’ states and
events and even the causal relationships between conditions
and events.
J J J
Figure 11. Post-hoc judgement involving a
judgemental system (top) and an active sys-
tem (bottom).
In practice, judgement is likely to involve consideration
not just of what (allegedly) happened but also what could
have and should have happened, perhaps based on a sys-
tem design or specification. An extended occurrence net
notation that is used to represent such matters is the ‘barb’
(introduced in [11]), namely an event that could have oc-
curred, given the condition(s) that existed, but which did
not — see Fig. 12 below, where the barbs are represented
by a distinctive kind of boxes.
Figure 12. What did not occur.
Retracing the ‘fault-error-failure’ chain, after a judgment
has been made that a particular event needs to be regarded
as a failure involves following causal arrows in either direc-
tion within a given occurrence net, and following relations
so as to move from one occurrence net to another. Thus one
could retrace (i) the source and / or consequence of an inter-
action between systems, (ii) from a system to some guilty
component(s), (iii) from a component to the system(s) that
has been built from it, or (iv) from a given system to the
system(s) that created or modified it, or to the system(s) that
should have allowed it to continue to exist. All this tracing
activity can be undertaken by some tracing system (perhaps
a part of the judgement system) using whatever evidence is
available (e.g., a retained occurrence net which is alleged
to record what happened). This tracing system (just like a
judgment system) can of course itself fail (in the eyes of
some other judgment system)!
The actual implementation of such tracing in situations
of ongoing activity, and of potential further failures, e.g.,
such as interfering with witnesses and the jury (in a judicial
context), involves problems such as those addressed by the
chase protocols [16]. (The name reflects the fact that error
diagnosis and reporting messages have to chase after the
ever-spreading errors.)
7 Utilising Structured Occurrence Nets
One can envisage a given judge, having identified some
system event as a failure, analysing a structured occurrence
net, i.e., a set of related occurrence nets (dealing with the
various abstractions of the various relevant systems), in an
attempt to identify (i) the fault(s) that should be blamed for
the failure, and / or (ii) the erroneous states that could and
should be corrected or compensated for. Unless we assume
that the occurrence nets are recorded correctly and com-
pletely as an automated by-product of system activity, in
undertaking such a task it may well prove appropriate dur-
ing such an analysis to correct or add to the occurrence nets,
both individually and as a set, based on additional evidence
or assumptions about what occurred.
Different judges (even different automated judgement
systems) could of course, even if they identify the same fail-
ure event, come to different decisions regarding what actu-
ally happened and in determining the related faults and er-
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rors — possibly because they use different additional infor-
mation (e.g., assumptions and information relating to sys-
tem designs and specifications) to augment the information
provided by the occurrence nets themselves.
The result of such analyses could be thought of as in-
volving the marking-up of the set of occurrence nets so as to
indicate a four-way classification of all their places, namely
as ‘Erroneous’, ‘Correct’, ‘Undecided’, and ‘Not consid-
ered’. As indicated earlier, the production of such a classi-
fication is likely to involve repeated partial traversals of the
occurrence nets, following causal arrows backwards within
a given occurrence net in a search for causes and forwards
in a search for consequences. In addition it will involve fol-
lowing relations so as to move from one occurrence net to
another. Two simplistic examples of this are: (i) the recog-
nition that a given system’s behaviour had, after a period of
correct operation, started to exhibit a succession of faults,
might lead to investigating the related occurrence net repre-
senting the system’s evolution to determine if it had suffered
a modification at the relevant time, and (ii) evidence of the
non-occurrence of an expected event might be found to be
due to a failure of an infrastructural system, such as a power
supply. (Due to page limit we omitted here a discussion, in-
cluded in [13], of an abstraction relation which can be used
to model the relationship between hardware and the soft-
ware processes that are running on it, and indeed between
the electricity source and the hardware that it powers.)
This way of describing the failure analysis task using oc-
currence nets might be regarded as essentially metaphorical,
i.e., essentially just as a way of describing (semi)formally
what is often currently done by expert investigators in the
aftermath of a major system failure. However, at the other
extreme one can imagine attempting to automate the record-
ing and analysis of actual occurrence nets — indeed one
could argue that this is likely to be a necessary function of
any complex system that really merited the currently fash-
ionable appellations ‘self-healing’ and ‘autonomic’.
The more likely, and practical, possibility — one that
we plan to investigate — is the provision of computer as-
sistance for the tasks of representing, checking the legal-
ity of, and performing analyses of, structured occurrence
nets. This is because the task of analysing and / or deriving
the scenarios depicted by structured occurrence nets will, in
real life, be too complex to be undertaken as a simple pencil
exercise. The main reason is that the systems we primarily
aim at are (highly) concurrent and so their behaviour suffers
from the so-called ‘state explosion problem’. In a nutshell,
even the most basic problems are then of non-polynomial
complexity and so perhaps the only way to deal with them
is to use highly optimised automated tools. This work could
build on earlier work at Newcastle [7, 9] on the unfoldings
of Petri nets introduced in [15], and also benefit, e.g., from
recent work at Rennes [4] on the diagnosis of executions of
concurrent systems.
A quite different use of such sets of related occurrence
nets might in fact prove feasible. This would be to use
them as a way of modelling complex system behaviour
prior to system deployment, so as to facilitate the use of
some form of automated model-checking in order to verify
at least some aspects of the design of the system(s). Alterna-
tively such automated model-checking might be used to as-
sist analysis of the records of actual failures of complex sys-
tems. Such work could take good advantage of recent work
at Newcastle on the model-checking of designs, originally
expressed in the pi-calculus, work which involves the auto-
mated generation and analysis of occurrence nets [8]. For
the integration of different formalisms, solvers and quanti-
tative tools one could follow an approach adopted in mod-
elling tools like Mo¨bius [5].
There is in principle yet another avenue that could be
explored, namely that of using structured occurrence nets
which have been shown to exhibit desirable behaviour, in-
cluding automated tolerance and / or diagnosis of faults,
as an aid to designing systems that are guaranteed to ex-
hibit such behaviour when deployed. We have in fact, with
colleagues, already shown that it is possible to synthesize
asynchronous VLSI sub-systems via the use of formal rep-
resentations based on occurrence nets [9], but such designs
are much less complex than those that we have had in mind
while developing the concept of structured occurrence nets.
8 Concluding Remarks
A major aim of the present paper has been to introduce,
and motivate the study of, the concept that we term struc-
tured occurrence nets, a concept that we claim could serve
as a basis for possible improved techniques of failure pre-
vention and analysis of complex evolving systems. This is
because the various types of abstractions that the concept of
a structured occurrence nets make use of are all ones that
we suggest could facilitate the task of understanding com-
plex systems and their failures, and that of the analysis of
the cause(s) of such failures. These abstractions would in
most cases be a natural consequence of the way the sys-
tem, or rather systems, have been conceived and perceived,
rather than abstractions that have to be generated after the
fact, during analysis. As such they can in fact be regarded
as providing a somewhat sophisticated means of naturally
structuring what would otherwise be an impossibly large
and complex occurrence net. Alternatively, they can be re-
garded as a way of reducing the combinatorial complexity
of the information that is accumulated and the analyses that
are performed on this information in following fault-error-
failure chains after the fact, in complex systems contain-
ing not just hardware and software, but perhaps also hu-
man ‘components’. In either case, however, we envisage
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the necessity of providing computer assistance, something
we plan to do by building on existing relevant work at New-
castle and elsewhere.
A second aim of the paper has therefore been that of pro-
viding the formalizations of the various types of abstraction
used in structured occurrence nets that are needed as a start-
ing point for the task of implementing, or enhancing exist-
ing, analysis tools. The formal definitions and theorems that
form a major part of the present paper provide a necessary
basis for the development of effective software for such pur-
poses. To this end an extended version of the present paper
that completes this formalization and includes our proofs
of relevant results, and goes into details of algorithms that
might be used, is in preparation [13].
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